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Two Is Company but Is It a Quorum? 
John Sanchez* 
The basic tool for the manipulation of reality is the manipulation of 
words.  If you can control the meaning of words, you can control the people 
who must use the words.1 
- Philip K. Dick 
I.      INTRODUCTION 
At full strength, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) consists 
of a chairperson and four members.  Historically, the chair is a member of 
the president’s political party and the other board members consist of two 
Democrats and two Republicans.2  Vacancies on the Board are common.  
On December 16, 2007, Board Chairman Robert J. Battista’s term expired, 
leaving four members on the Board.  On December 20, 2007, the remaining 
four members of the Board (Wilma Liebman, Peter Schaumber, Peter 
Kirsanow, and Dennis Walsh) unanimously voted to delegate all of its   
powers to a three-member group consisting of Board members Liebman, 
Schaumber, and Kirsanow, effective December 28, 2007.  This delegation 
took place when there were “three or more” sitting Board members even 
though the Board knew at the time of the delegation that two members’ 
terms would end in days.  On December 31, 2007, the recess appointments 
of members Walsh and Kirsanow expired.  From January 1, 20083 until 
March 26, 2010 – when President Obama, exercising his recess appoint-
                                                                                                                           
 * John Sanchez is a Professor of Law at Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law 
Center. 
1 Philip K. Dick, How to Build a Universe That Doesn’t Fall Apart Two Days Later, I HOPE I 
SHALL ARRIVE SOON 1 (1985). 
 2 See James J. Brudney, Isolated and Politicized: The NLRB’s Uncertain Future, 26 COMP. LAB. 
L. & POL’Y J. 221, 244 & n.110 (2005); Ronald Turner, Ideological Voting on the National Labor Rela-
tions Board, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 707, 714 & n.42 (2006); Ronald Turner, On the Authority of the 
Two-Member NLRB: Statutory Interpretation Approaches and Judicial Choices, 27 HOFSTRA LABOR 
AND EMPLOYMENT L.J. 13 (2009); Kleisinger & Bales, The Validity of the Two-Member NLRB, 6 SETON 
HALL CIRCUIT REV. 261 (2010) (concluding that the Supreme Court should and will hold that the two-
member Board decisions are contrary to the express language of the statute). 
 3 The Seventh Circuit in New Process Steel mistakenly cited the date as January 1, 2009.  See 
New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 840, 845 (7th Cir. 2009), rev’d, No. 08-1457, slip op. (U.S. 
June 17, 2010). 
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ments power,4 named two new members to the Board5 – the NLRB rendered 
nearly 600 decisions with only two sitting members.6  
This article contends that the issue of whether a quorum of the NLRB 
requires two or three members can be resolved wholly on the basis of the 
plain language of the statute: there must at all times be three members of 
the NLRB for there to be a quorum.  Neither canons of construction nor 
legislative history sheds much light on the quorum issue.  Moreover, resort 
to common law agency principles or to analogous federal administrative 
agency quorum requirements is equally inconclusive.  Also, no deference is 
owed to the NLRB on the quorum question since the Board never formally 
ruled on this issue.  Finally, policy arguments weigh heavily in favor of a 
three-member quorum on the labor board.  The quorum question may arise 
again in the future if board membership should ever again fall to two.  For 
this reason, this article recommends that Congress amend the vacancy pro-
vision of Section 3(b) of the NLRA to make clear, as it has in the enabling 
statutes of other federal administrative agencies, that Board members whose 
terms expire will continue to serve until their successors officially take their 
places.   
                                                                                                                           
 4 Recess appointments are authorized by Article II, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, which 
states: “The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the 
Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.”  In Evans v. 
Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2004), the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the Constitution permitted both 
intrasession recess appointments and recess appointments to fill vacancies that existed prior to the 
congressional recess.  See Michael B. Rappaport, The Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments 
Clause, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1487, 1495 (2005).  The Senate can prevent recess appointments by holding 
pro forma sessions, as Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid held from November 2007 to the end of 
President Bush’s term to prevent his controversial uses of the recess power.  So long as a Senate recess 
is no longer than three days, no recess appointments can be made.  After Becker’s recess appointment, 
Senate Republicans threaten to do the same to President Obama’s use of this power. 
 5 Steven Greenhouse, Deadlock Is Ending on Labor Board, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2010, at B1.  
President Obama appointed Craig Becker, a lawyer for the A.F.L.-C.I.O and the Service Employees 
International Union and Mark Pearce, a Buffalo-based lawyer, both pro-union.  Senator McCain pre-
vented a Senate vote on these nominees, contending that Mr. Becker would deny employers their proper 
role in union elections.  Steven Greenhouse, Labor Panel Is Stalled by Dispute on Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 14, 2010.  “Republicans and the business lobby have portrayed the vote on Becker in particular as a 
litmus test for the Democrats’ proposed ‘card check’ legislation which would make it easier to form 
unions.”  Tony Romm,  Labor Board Chief Wants Vote on NLRB Nominees, THE HILL’S BLOG BRIEFING 
ROOM, Feb. 5, 2010.  Mr. Becker has been criticized by business groups over a law-review article pub-
lished in 1993 that proposed limits on employers’ efforts to undermine unionization of their employees.  
Quorum Quibbles, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 7, 2010. 
 6 New Process Steel, L.P., No. 08-1457, slip op. at 3.  The types of decisions include: resolving 
allegations of unfair labor practices and disputes over union representation; cases involving employers’ 
discharges of employees for exercising their organizational rights; disputes over secret ballot elections to 
select a union representative; employers’ unlawful withdrawals of recognition of union representatives, 
and refusals by employers or unions to honor their obligation to bargain in good faith. 
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Part II briefly summarizes the case of New Process Steel while Part III 
summarizes the circuit court split on the quorum issue.  Part IV assesses the 
various legal bases for resolving whether two or three constitutes a quorum 
of the NLRB.  This section looks at the text of the NLRA, its legislative 
history and tradition.  As some courts have reasoned, when none of these 
sources resolves the issue, the question, at times, can be decided by giving 
deference to the NLRB’s own interpretation of the quorum issue.  Other 
courts have looked to common law doctrines such as agency and the de 
facto officer doctrine for assistance in deciding this issue.  Moreover, the 
search for the relevant analogy has led some authorities to look at the quor-
um question involving federal judges or other federal administrative agen-
cies such as the National Mediation Board and the Interstate Commerce 
Commission.  Part IV examines the policy arguments for deciding whether 
two or three constitutes a quorum of the NLRB. 
Part V reflects on the Supreme Court’s ruling in New Process Steel, 
requiring the NLRB to have three members to conduct business, which 
leaves in legal limbo nearly 600 decisions rendered before President      
Obama’s recess appointees reconstituted the Board in March 2010.  Part V 
considers how the Court’s own decision may affect the legal status of deci-
sions rendered by the rump panel.  Alternatively, this section addresses how 
Congress might amend the NLRA to deal with the quorum question in the 
event the Board shrinks to two members again in the future.  Finally, Part V 
considers what options are open to the newly constituted Board on how to 
deal with past decisions handed down by the two-member Board. 
II.  NEW PROCESS STEEL V. NLRB 
In New Process Steel v. NLRB,7 the employer and the union reached an 
impasse in negotiating the terms of a collective bargaining agreement.  The 
union filed an unfair labor practice charge.  The administrative law judge 
(ALJ) ruled in the union’s favor.  The employer appealed to the NLRB, 
whose two members approved the ALJ’s judgment.  The employer appealed 
to the Seventh Circuit.  Apart from challenging the merits of the Board’s 
findings, the employer claimed that the Board lacked authority to issue its 
decision because, it argued, two members do not constitute a quorum under 
Section 3(b) of the NLRA.  In response, the NLRB asserted that since the 
Board had properly delegated authority to a three-member panel, the two 
remaining members did constitute a quorum.  The Seventh Circuit ruled in 
the Board’s favor based on the plain language of Section 3(b).  The same 
                                                                                                                           
 7 New Process Steel, L.P., No. 08-1457, slip op., rev’g, 564 F.3d 840. 
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day, the District of Columbia Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in 
Laurel Bay Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc. v. NLRB.8 
On November 2, 2009, the Supreme Court granted review in New Pro-
cess Steel v. NLRB,9 agreeing to rule on whether the vacancy-riddled NLRB 
lacked authority to render decisions with only two of its five members cur-
rently in office since January 1, 2008.  Oral argument was held on March 
23, 2010,10 and a decision was handed down June 17, 2010.  By a vote of 5-
4, the Supreme Court ruled “that the delegation clause requires that a dele-
gee group maintain a membership of three in order to exercise the delegated 
authority of the board.”11  The majority based its decision primarily on the 
plain language of the statute.  Moreover, the majority noted that its decision 
was consistent with the board’s longstanding practice with respect to dele-
gee groups. 
III.  CIRCUIT COURT SPLIT 
The First,12 Second,13 Fourth,14 Seventh,15 Ninth,16 and Tenth17 Circuits 
have upheld the authority of two-member Board decisions, and there are 
over seventy-seven challenges to the validity of two-member rulings cur-
rently pending in federal Courts of Appeals.18  Only the District of Colum-
bia Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that three members constitute a 
quorum on the NLRB. 
The Seventh Circuit upheld a decision by the two-member NLRB pan-
el grounded on the “plain meaning” of section 3(b) of the Act, noting that 
its reading squares with the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act.  The 
Seventh Circuit also relied on the Office of Legal Counsel’s opinion letter,19 
the First Circuit’s decision in Northeastern Land Services v. NLRB,20 and 
dictum from the Ninth Circuit in Photo-Sonics, Inc. v. NLRB.21 
                                                                                                                           
 8 564 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 9 New Process Steel, L.P., No. 08-1457, slip op. 
 10 Transcript of Oral Argument, New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, No. 08-1457, slip op. (U.S. 
June 17, 2010), 2010 WL 1285395. 
 11 New Process Steel, L.P., No. 08-1457, slip op. at 13. 
 12 Ne. Land Servs., Ltd.  v. NLRB, 560 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2009), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 3498 (2010). 
 13 Snell Island SNF L.L.C. v. NLRB, 568 F.3d 410 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 14 Narricot Indus. v. NLRB, 587 F.3d 654 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 15 New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 16 Photo-Sonics, Inc. v. NLRB, 678 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 17 Teamsters Local Union No. 523 v. NLRB, 590 F.3d 849 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 18 See NLRB’s Response to FOIA Request ID/LR-2009-0432 (May 29, 2009). 
 19 Memorandum Opinion issued by the Office of Legal Counsel of the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice, 2003 WL 24166831 (Mar. 4, 2003). 
 20 Ne. Land Servs., Ltd., 560 F.3d at 36. 
 21 Photo-Sonics, 678 F.2d at 121. 
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The First Circuit ruled that the “plain text” of the Act authorized the 
decisions by the two-member panel, without discussing the legislative his-
tory of the statute.22  The Second23 and Tenth24 Circuits relied on different 
reasoning from the First and Seventh Circuits, which grounded their rulings 
largely on the unambiguous plain text of the statute.  Instead, both the Se-
cond and Tenth Circuits ruled that the text of section 3(b) was ambiguous 
and that the relevant canon of construction and the Act’s legislative history 
were unhelpful.  For this reason, both circuits turned to the second step of 
Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc.,25 which in-
sists upon deference to an agency’s statutory interpretation whenever the 
agency is charged with administering the statute and the agency’s reading is 
reasonable. 
The Ninth Circuit, in Photo-Sonics, Inc. v. NLRB,26 while not specifi-
cally addressing the precise issue, ruled that two members of a properly 
created three-member group could issue a decision even after the resigna-
tion of the third member of the group.  The relevance of Photo-Sonics is 
further undermined by the fact that the NLRB “as a whole continued to 
have four members, even after one member of the ‘group’ resigned.” 
By contrast, in Laurel Baye,27 the District of Columbia Circuit over-
turned a ruling by a two-member panel, citing the plain language of section 
3(b) of the Act, noting that its reading melds with analogous principles of 
agency law, but without discussing the relevant legislative history. 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
A. Text 
1. Plain Language 
Section 3(b) of the NLRA states, in relevant part, that: 
The Board is authorized to delegate to any group of three or more 
members any or all of the powers which it may itself exercise. . . .  A 
vacancy in the Board shall not impair the right of the remaining mem-
bers to exercise all of the powers of the Board, and three members of 
the Board shall, at all times, constitute a quorum of the Board, except 
                                                                                                                           
 22 Ne. Land Servs. Ltd., 560 F.3d at 41. 
 23 Snell Island SNF L.L.C. v. NLRB, 568 F.3d 410 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 24 Teamsters Local Union No. 523 v. NLRB, 590 F.3d 849 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 25 Chevron U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 26 Photo-Sonics, Inc. v. NLRB, 678 F.2d 121, 123 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 27 Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 469, 475 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
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that two members shall constitute a quorum of any group designated 
pursuant to the first sentence hereof.28 
As the Fourth Circuit put it: 
Section 3(b) contains three provisions that are pertinent here: (1) a 
‘delegation’ provision, allowing the Board to delegate ‘any or all’ of 
its powers to a three-member group; (2) a ‘vacancy’ provision, provid-
ing that a vacancy in the Board ‘shall not impair’ the authority of the 
remaining Board members to act; and (3) a ‘quorum’ provision, 
providing that three members constitute a quorum of the Board, but 
with an exception providing that two Board members constitute a 
quorum of any group designated pursuant to the ‘delegation’ provi-
sion.29 
The D.C. Circuit Court adds, I think correctly, that section 3(b) con-
tains a fourth provision, a “delegee group” quorum provision that “two 
members shall constitute a quorum of any [three-member] group [to which 
the Board delegated its powers pursuant to the delegation provision.]”30 
Two separate arguments emerge from section 3(b)’s “delegation” pro-
vision, both of which lead to the conclusion that two-member Boards are 
unauthorized to act.  The first argument avers “that the Board’s delegation 
was improper in the first instance” because the Board knew no third mem-
ber would ever hear cases since his term expired a week after the delegation 
took place.31  The second argument insists that, although the initial delega-
tion was valid, it became invalid once the third Board member left.  By 
contrast, defenders of two-member Boards make clear that provided the 
initial delegation to a three-member group was valid, it is irrelevant that 
subsequently one member left or her term expired.32 
The First Circuit focused on the vacancy provision:  
[A] vacancy in the Board shall not impair the right of the remaining 
members to exercise all of the powers of the Board.  In our view, if the 
board delegated all of its powers to a group of three members, that 
group could continue to issue decisions and orders as long as a quor-
um of two members remained.33 
                                                                                                                           
 28 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (2006). 
 29 Narricot Indus. v. NLRB, 587 F.3d 654, 660 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 30 Laurel Baye Healthcare, 564 F.3d at 471. 
 31 This argument was made by New Process Steel.  See New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 564 
F.3d 840, 845 (7th Cir. 2009), rev’d, No. 08-1457, slip op. (U.S. June 17, 2010). 
 32 See, e.g., Opinion of the Office of Legal Counsel, supra note 19. 
 33 Ne. Land Servs. Ltd., 560 F.3d at 41. 
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Similarly, the Fourth Circuit concluded that “under the plain and un-
ambiguous text of Section 3(b), . . . the designated three-member group was 
empowered to act with a two-member quorum.”34  The Fourth Circuit 
deemed the D.C. Circuit’s decision as: 
an overly narrow construction of the modifying phrase that directly 
follows the three-member quorum requirement. . . . The statutory 
phrase ‘except that’ ordinarily introduces an exception. . . . If the loss 
of one member of a three-member group automatically caused the 
group to cease to exist, then a two-member quorum would never suf-
fice.  The statute, however, expressly provides for a three-member 
designated group to act with only two members.35 
Moreover, the Fourth Circuit held that the D.C. Circuit’s reading of section 
3(b) is “inconsistent with 3(b)’s ‘vacancy’ provision, which specifies that a 
‘vacancy in the Board’ – or, necessarily, a three-member group acting with 
the full powers of the Board – ‘shall not impair the right of the remaining 
members to exercise all of the powers of the Board.”36 
Finally, the Seventh Circuit concluded that: 
the vacancy of one member of a three[-] member panel does not im-
pede the right of the remaining two members to execute the full dele-
gated powers of the NLRB.  As the NLRB delegated its full powers to 
a group of three Board members, the two remaining Board members 
can proceed as a quorum despite the subsequent vacancy.37 
By contrast, in Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier v. NLRB, the 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals, alone among the circuit courts, con-
cluded that two-member NLRB Boards are unauthorized to render binding 
decisions.38  Relying principally on the “at all times” requirement for Board 
quorum, the Court ruled that a “three-member Board may delegate its pow-
ers to a three-member group, and this delegee group may act with two 
members so long as the Board quorum requirement is, ‘at all times,’ satis-
fied.  Whenever the Board loses jurisdiction because of a loss of quorum, so 
too do any panels of the Board lose jurisdiction, regardless of whether the 
panel retains a quorum.”39  The D.C. Circuit Court refused to rely on Laurel 
Baye’s argument that the Board delegation could not stand because it was a 
sham. 
                                                                                                                           
 34 Narricot Indus., 587 F.3d at 659. 
 35 Id. at 659-60.  
 36 Id. at 660. 
 37 New Process Steel, 564 F.3d at 845-46. 
 38 Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 39 Id. at 472-73. 
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The D.C. Circuit rejected the NLRB’s argument that the “except that” 
provision was an exception to the “at all times” requirement:   
[T]hree members of the Board shall, at all times, constitute a quorum 
of the Board, except that two members shall constitute a quorum of 
any group designated pursuant to the first sentence hereof. . . . Con-
gress’s use of differing object nouns [‘quorum of the Board’ versus 
‘quorum of any group’] within the two quorum provisions indicates 
clearly that each quorum provision is independent from the other . . . 
the delegee group quorum provision does not eliminate [the Board’s 
quorum] requirement . . . nor does it permit the two-member panel to 
‘circumvent the statutory Board quorum requirement.’40 
By contrast, supporters of a two-member quorum make an intertextual 
argument41 in reconciling the “at all times” and “except” provisions of sec-
tion 3(b).  “Indeed, Congress has used the construction ‘at all times . . .  
except’ in a number of statutes to accomplish exactly what it did [in § 3(b)] 
– to provide that a general rule should apply at all times except in the in-
stances specified in the statute.”42  For example, the Higher Education Op-
portunity Act43 provides that the Secretary of Education shall “maintain and 
preserve at all times the confidentiality of any program review report . . .  
except that the Secretary shall promptly disclose any and all program re-
view reports to the institution of higher education under review.”44 
2. Canons of Construction 
“The plain meaning rule relies upon the definitions of particular words 
and phrases to interpret text.  In contrast, the canons of construction are 
rules of inference that draw meaning from the structure or context of a writ-
ten rule.”45  In the end, however, reliance on any or all of the following  
canons of construction, either because they are unhelpful or because each 
                                                                                                                           
 40 Id. at 470. 
 41 Intertextual arguments “draw inferences about the meaning of legal text by comparing it to 
language of other legal documents. . . .”  WILSON HUHN, THE FIVE TYPES OF LEGAL ARGUMENT 37 (2d 
ed. 2008). 
 42 See Brief for NLRB by Solicitor General at 6, New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, No. 08-1457, 
slip op. (U.S. June 17, 2010). 
 43 Pub. L. No. 110-315, § 497, 122 Stat. 3328, (to be codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1099c-1(b)(8) (Supp. 
II 2008)). 
 44 Id. 
 45 HUHN, supra note 41, at 22. 
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canon can be undermined by a conflicting canon, does not resolve the quor-
um issue.46 
According to Chevron, “[o]nly if [a court] determines that Congress 
has not directly addressed the precise question at issue will [it] turn to   
canons of construction. . . .”47  Concluding that “[n]othing in the statute 
itself explains what happens to a duly constituted panel of the NLRB when 
the Board itself loses its quorum,” in Snell Island v. NLRB, the Second Cir-
cuit, like the D.C. Circuit in Laurel Baye, relied on “[a] cardinal principle of 
interpretation . . . that no provision is rendered inoperative or superfluous, 
void or insignificant.”48  Under this canon, “courts should avoid interpreta-
tions of statutes that ‘render statutory language surplusage.’”49  Specifically, 
the D.C. Circuit stressed that “the Board quorum requirement must be satis-
fied at all times.”50  While agreeing with this aspect of the D.C. Circuit’s 
analysis, the Second Circuit noted that this language “does not answer the 
precise question presented here: Once the Board has lost its quorum, what 
happens to a panel that was duly constituted before the Board lost its quor-
um?”51  For this reason, the Second Circuit turned to the Act’s legislative 
history for guidance, since the relevant canon of construction led nowhere. 
The 2003 Opinion by the Office of Legal Counsel invoked a canon of 
construction in interpreting section 3(b)’s vacancy provision:  
In the construction of an Act of Congress, ‘unless the context indicates 
otherwise – words importing the singular include and apply to several 
persons, parties, or things.’  Thus, the provision under which ‘[a] va-
cancy in the Board shall not impair the right of the remaining mem-
bers,’ also applies to more than one vacancy, as long as the quorum 
requirement is met.52 
                                                                                                                           
 46 But a foolish consistency is not necessarily a virtue.  As Walt Whitman put it: “Do I contradict 
myself?  Very well then, I contradict myself.  I am large, I contain multitudes.”  WALT WHITMAN, 
LEAVES OF GRASS 77 (The Modern Library 1921) (1855). 
 47 Chevron U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
 48 Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 469, 472 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
(citing Asiana Airlines v. FAA, 134 F.3d 393, 398 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).  This canon of construction is 
known as a textual canon which “operates like rules of syntax in that they are used to infer the meaning 
of a rule from its textual structure or context.”  HUHN, supra note 41, at 23.  By contrast, “substantive 
canons are interpretive principles that are derived from the legal effect of a rule.”  Id. at 24. 
 49 Snell Island SNF, L.L.C. v. NLRB, 568 F.3d 410, 420 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 50 Laurel Baye, 564 F.3d at 472. 
 51 Snell Island SNF, 568 F.3d at 420. 
 52 Opinion of the Office of Legal Counsel, supra note 19, at 2 n.3 (quoting 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006), 
and 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (2006), respectively). 
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An amicus brief53 invokes the “constitutional avoidance” canon of 
construction: “Where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute 
would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the 
statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary 
to the intent of Congress.”54  According to this argument, deferring to the 
NLRB’s interpretation of Section 3(b) “raises serious separation of powers 
concerns by permitting an independent regulatory agency to supplant the 
necessity of the President and the Senate to carry out their Article II respon-
sibilities to nominate and confirm officials to constitute the requisite     
quorum.”55 
The Supreme Court brief for Petitioner, New Process Steel, cited three 
additional canons of statutory construction in support of its conclusion that 
two-member groups lack authority to issue binding decisions: (1) words and 
clauses in a statute cannot be ignored, and each of them should be accorded 
its ordinary and natural meaning; (2) conflicts that arise between words and 
clauses must be resolved in a way that harmonizes them without diminish-
ing the force or meaning of any of them; and (3) each word and clause must 
be considered in its context so that no meaning is lost by unnaturally nar-
row focus.56  Again, application of these canons becomes circular and begs 
the question: Is there a separate quorum requirement for the Board and for a 
panel of the Board?  A substantive canon – “remedial statutes are to be lib-
erally construed” – might apply in this context, since the NLRA has been 
deemed a remedial statute.  If properly invoked, a liberal interpretation of 
the statute would seem to uphold the authority of two-member Boards to 
act.  Otherwise, two-member boards would have no alternative but to shut 
down altogether, leaving the goals of the NLRA unfulfilled.  Of course, it 
might be argued, such a stalemate would exert pressure on the President 
and Congress to fill vacancies.  But, again, this canon clearly conflicts with 
another substantive canon – “statutes in derogation of the common law are 
to be strictly construed.”57  The NLRA is both a remedial statute and in  
derogation of the common law; therefore, conflicting canons cancel each 
other out. 
                                                                                                                           
 53 See Brief for Amicus Curiae, Chamber of Commerce of the United States, In Support of Peti-
tioner, New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, No. 08-1457, slip op. (U.S. June 17, 2010). 
 54 Id. at 9 (citing Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 
485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)). 
 55 Id. 
 56 Brief for Petitioner at 13, New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, No. 08-1457, slip op. (U.S. June 
17, 2010). 
 57 HUHN, supra note 41, at 102. 
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B. Legislative History 
“Evidence of intent may be drawn from the text of the law itself, from 
previous versions of the text, from its drafting history, from official com-
ments, or from contemporary commentary.”58 
The National Labor Relations Act59 originally provided that the NLRB 
would consist of three members.60  Section 3(b) of the NLRA was amended 
by the Taft-Hartley Act, increasing the size of the Board from three mem-
bers to five.  The Taft-Hartley Act itself was a compromise between the 
House bill,61 which kept a three-member Board, and the Senate bill,62 which 
proposed increasing the Board from three to seven members. 
In support of its ruling that two-member Boards are valid, the Seventh 
Circuit noted that the primary reason Congress expanded the size of the 
Board from three to five was to increase the efficiency of the Board.63  A 
five-member Board would:  
allow the NLRB to hear more cases by creating panels of the entire 
Board.  There is no suggestion in the relevant reports that the Board is 
restricted from acting when its membership falls below a certain level. 
. . .  Indeed, a court interpreting the statute that way would hinder the 
efficient panel operation that Congress intended to create.64 
At first glance, the “efficiency” argument gleaned from the Taft-
Hartley amendments appears to be a strong argument in support of the view 
that Congress authorized two-member Boards.  But is the Board operating 
efficiently when one Board member or another is constantly stifling his or 
her true beliefs in the interest of preventing gridlock?  Indeed, both current 
Board members, Liebman and Schaumber, have stated on the record that 
each has trimmed his or her sails on many cases these past two years in the 
interest of keeping the NLRB up and running. 
On rare occasions, the NLRB has rendered decisions by a two-member 
Board where the third member either recused himself or otherwise failed to 
                                                                                                                           
 58 Id. at 34. 
 59 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169. 
 60 See Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, § 3(a), 49 Stat. 449, 451 (amended 1947). 
 61 H.R. REP. NO. 80-245 (1947). 
 62 S. REP. 80-105, at 19 (1947). 
 63 New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 840, 847 (7th Cir. 2009), rev’d, No. 08-1457, slip 
op. (U.S. June 17, 2010) (“‘There is no field in which time is more important, yet the Board from 12 to 
18 months behind in its docket. . . . The expansion of the Board from three to seven members, which 
this bill proposes, would permit it to operate in panels of three, thereby increasing by 100 percent its 
ability to dispose of cases expeditiously in the final stage. . . .’” (quoting S. REP. NO. 80-105, at 8 
(1947)). 
 64 Id. 
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join in a decision.65  Nevertheless, these decisions were still issued by all 
three members and so do not undermine the principle that a three-member 
board constitutes a quorum. 
C. Tradition 
1. 1935-1947 
Under the original Wagner Act, the NLRB consisted of only three 
members.  The Act specifically provided that a vacancy on the three-
member Board would not impair the quorum of the two remaining members 
from exercising all of the powers of the Board.66  In fact, from 1935 to 
1947, the Board frequently decided cases with a quorum of two members 
when one of the three seats was vacant.  Originally, the NLRB was intended 
to be a nonpartisan body composed of three impartial government mem-
bers.67 
2. 1947-2010 
When the Taft-Hartley Act increased the NLRB’s size to five mem-
bers, Congress decided it wanted the labor board to remain nonpartisan.68  
But over time it became customary for the President to appoint three mem-
bers of his political party and two members from the opposite political par-
ty.69  This evolution from nonpartisan to partisan means that the Board 
could end up with members of only one political party.  While Petitioner’s 
brief suggests that this fact bolsters the argument in favor of a three-
member quorum,70 a two-member board could just as likely end up repre-
senting only one political party. 
In 1974, when the NLRB had three members, it issued a decision in a 
representation case, KFC National Management Corp. v. NLRB,71 through a 
single Board member and two senior staff attorneys.  The Second Circuit 
                                                                                                                           
 65 E.g., Wisconsin Bell, Inc., 346 N.L.R.B. 62 (2005). 
 66 See Wagner Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 3(a), 49 Stat. 449, 451 (1935) (“There is hereby created 
a board. . . which shall be composed of three members. . . .”); id. § 3(b) (“A vacancy in the Board shall 
not impair the right of the remaining members to exercise all the powers of the Board, and two members 
of the Board shall, at all times, constitute a quorum.”). 
 67 See Sen. Comm. Print, Comparison of S. 2926 (73d Cong.) and S. 1958 (74th Cong.) § 3 
(1935), reprinted in 1 Leg. Hist. 1947 at 1319-20. 
 68 See H.R. REP. 80-510 at 36-37 (1947), reprinted in 1 Leg. Hist. 1947 at 540-41. 
 69 See Ronald Turner, Ideological Voting on the National Labor Relations Board, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. 
& EMP. L. 707, 714 n.42 (2006). 
 70 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 56, at 33-34. 
 71 KFC Nat’l Mgmt. Corp. v. NLRB, 497 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1974). 
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rejected the Board’s attempt to ignore the quorum and panel requirements 
in the service of efficiency.72 
The problem of Board member turnover and vacancies was persistent 
during President Clinton’s first year in office, when the Board fell to two 
members.73 
When the NLRB’s membership has dropped to three, the Board con-
sistently designated those members as a “group” in cases where one mem-
ber would be disqualified yet a quorum of the remaining two members 
would reach a ruling.  As the 2003 Opinion of the Office of Legal Counsel 
made clear, “this practice suggests that three-member groups may be consti-
tuted even when it is foreseen that only two members will actually partici-
pate in a decision.”74 
Former Board Chair, Robert Battista, estimated “that in his time on the 
NLRB, it operated with fewer than the full five members about 30 percent 
of the time.”75 
On August 26, 2005, the three-member NLRB delegated all of the 
Board’s powers to themselves as a three-member group in anticipation of 
the expiration of Member Schaumber’s term on August 27, 2005.76  For the 
next four days, before Member Schaumber was reappointed through a re-
cess appointment, the two-member group handed down several unpublished 
orders and one published ruling on a procedural motion.77  In Snell Island 
SNF LLC v. NLRB, the Second Circuit upheld a two-member quorum in 
part because Congress historically has let decisions stand by a two-member 
NLRB.78 
                                                                                                                           
 72 Id. 
 73 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 56, at 6 (“For a short period in 1993, the Board actually fell 
to two members, one short of its statutory quorum” and noting: “During this period, the Board could not 
act on contested cases.  Anticipating the loss of a quorum, the Board delegated the section10(j) authority 
to the General Counsel.”  The Board’s “10(j)” authority is the power to seek injunctive relief in certain 
Unfair Labor Practice cases. . . .”) (citing John E. Higgins, Jr., Labor Czars – Commissars – Keeping 
Women in the Kitchen – The Purpose and Effects of the Administrative Changes Made by Taft-Hartley, 
47 CATH. U.L. REV. 941, 954 n.43 (1998)). 
 74 Opinion of the Office of Legal Counsel, supra note 19, at 3; see also Marshall J. Breger & 
Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 
ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1274 (2000) (“[W]here the Board has fallen below three members, the Board has 
declined to rule on pending contested matters until a third member has been appointed.”); John C. 
Trusdale, Battling Case Backlogs at the NLRB: The Continuing Problem of Delays in Decision Making 
and the Clinton Board’s Response, 16 LAB. LAW. J. 1, 6 n.20 (2000). 
 75 Adele Nicholas, Court Approves Authority of Two-Member NLRB, INSIDE COUNSEL, June 1, 
2009, at 70. 
 76 Brief for NLRB by Solicitor General, supra note 42 (citing BNA, 166 Daily Labor Rep., A-1, 
at 17 n.15 (Aug. 29, 2005)). 
 77 Id. (citing Extendicare Homes, Inc., 345 N.L.R.B. 905 (2005)). 
 78 568 F.3d 410. 
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D. Chevron Deference 
While courts generally enjoy a wide berth in reviewing questions of 
law, in administrative law there is a long tradition of deferring to the legal 
positions taken by agencies.  Coincidentally, one of the first Supreme Court 
decisions that shaped this doctrine of deference involved the NLRB.  In 
NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc.,79 the Supreme Court deferred to the 
Board’s ruling that newsboys were employees covered by the NLRA be-
cause Congress delegated to the Board the duty to determine what kinds of 
workers constitute employees.  So long as the Board applied proper legal 
standards, the reviewing court’s function was at an end. 
The Supreme Court refined its deference to agencies’ interpretations 
doctrine in what is now the leading case on the doctrine, Chevron U.S.A., 
Inc. v. NRDC.80  According to Chevron, if neither the canons of construction 
nor legislative history reveal Congress’s intent, courts should proceed to 
Chevron’s step two, directing courts to defer to an agency’s interpretation of 
the statute it administers, so long as it is reasonable.81  Turning to step two, 
both the Second and Tenth82 Circuits concluded that the NLRB’s interpreta-
tion of Section 3(b) – asserting that two members constitute a quorum – 
was a reasonable interpretation, especially given that panels of two mem-
bers would allow the Board to continue to operate.  While conceding that 
the D.C. Circuit’s reading of the statute was equally reasonable, the Second 
and Tenth Circuits concluded that “in applying Chevron deference, an 
agency’s ‘view governs if it is a reasonable interpretation of the statute – 
not necessarily the only possible interpretation, nor even the interpretation 
deemed most reasonable by the courts.’”83 
Nevertheless, the argument can be made that the NLRB never itself 
authoritatively determined what number of members constitutes a quorum, 
relying instead entirely on the Office of Legal Counsel’s opinion that two 
members constitute a quorum.84  Under this view, no deference is owed the 
OLC opinion since it is not the agency that administers the NLRA.85  As 
pointed out in New Process Steel’s brief,86 “[e]ven if deference were appro-
priate, it is undermined by the Board’s failure to conduct rulemaking or 
engage in any public deliberative process.”87 
                                                                                                                           
 79 NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944). 
 80 Chevron U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 81 568 F.3d at 415. 
 82 Teamsters Local Union No. 523 v. NLRB, 590 F.3d 849 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 83 568 F.3d at 424 (quoting Energy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1498, 1505 (2009)). 
 84 See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, supra note 56, at 12 n.6.   
 85 Id.(citing Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 137 n.9 (1997)). 
 86 Id. at 28 & n.13. 
 87 Id. (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001)). 
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Some legal scholars have noted that, for a time, the Supreme Court 
“added a third, threshold step – a ‘Step Zero’ – to the Chevron framework, 
asking whether an agency’s decision is of a kind that deserves any defer-
ence at all.”88 
E. Common Law Doctrines 
1. Agency Principles 
In Laurel Baye, the D.C. Circuit relied in part on basic tenets of agen-
cy and corporation law in support of its ruling that three Board members are 
required for it to conduct business.89  In other words, three-member groups 
acted as an agent of the Board.  Consequently, “an agent’s delegated author-
ity terminates when the powers belonging to the entity that bestowed the 
authority are suspended.”90  “Under established common law principles, 
institutional delegations of power are not affected by changes in personnel” 
since such power is not held individually, “but collectively among the 
members of a public board or commission.”91 
But this reliance on agency is misplaced for a few reasons.  First, 
agency suggests the creation of a fiduciary relationship which does not  
accurately describe how NLRB panels relate to the Board itself.  As one 
brief put it, “Board members in the group have been jointly delegated all of 
the Board’s institutional powers and thus are fully empowered to exercise 
them, not as Board agents, but as the Board itself.”92  Secondly, in Yardmas-
ters of America v. Harris,93 the same D.C. Circuit rejected reliance on agen-
cy principles in a case addressing the definition of quorum under another 
federal labor statute, concluding that the operations of a public agency 
should continue to function in circumstances where a private body might be 
disabled. 
                                                                                                                           
 88 See Abigail R. Moncrieff, Reincarnating the ‘Major Questions’ Exception to Chevron Defer-
ence as a Doctrine of Non-Interference (Or Why Massachusetts v. EPA Got it Wrong), HARV. LAW 
SCHOOL FACULTY SCHOLARSHIP SERIES 5 (2008), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard_faculty/12; 
see also Cass R. Sustein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006) (assessing the “major ques-
tions” exception). 
 89 The D.C. Circuit relied on the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.07(4) (2006), and 
WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, 2 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 421 (“If there 
are fewer than the minimum of directors required by statute, [the remaining directors] cannot act as a 
board.”).  Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 90 Id. at 473. 
 91 Appellate Brief, Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc. v. NLRB, Nos. 08-1162 & 08-
1214, 2008 WL 4735424, at *10 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 92 Surreply Brief For The National Labor Relations Board at 9, No. 09-1194, NLRB v. Am. Direc-
tional Boring, Inc. d/b/a ADB Utility Contractors, Inc. (8th Cir. 2009).  
 93 721 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
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2. De Facto Officer Doctrine 
In oral argument before the Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy raised the 
possibility that two-member quorums might be allowed under the de facto 
officer doctrine.  An officer de facto: 
is one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the law, upon 
principles of policy and justice, will hold valid, so far as they involve 
the interests of the public and third persons, where the duties of the of-
fice are exercised . . . under color of a known election or appointment, 
void because the officer was not eligible, or because there was a want 
of power in the electing or appointing body, or by reason of some de-
fect or irregularity . . . being unknown to the public.94 
The doctrine was developed to protect the public from the confusion 
that would ensue if actions taken by public officials could subsequently be 
invalidated by pointing out defects in the officials’ authority. 
The doctrine, however, distinguishes between procedural defects, 
which are subject to waiver, and jurisdictional defects, which are non-
waivable.  The weight of authority strongly suggests that lack of a quorum 
is a jurisdictional, not a procedural, defect that can be waived.  For this rea-
son, it is unlikely that the de facto officer doctrine can settle the quorum 
issue satisfactorily. 
F. Analogies 
In assessing the NLRB quorum issue, both sides support their position 
by pointing to other quorum cases arising under other federal statutes, such 
as the enabling statute for federal courts, or the operation of the National 
Mediation Board and the Interstate Commerce Commission.  In the end, 
however, none of these analogies are dispositive, either because of the dif-
fering statutory language or because of differences in the way these federal 
courts and agencies operate. 
1. Analogies to Judges 
In New Process Steel, the petitioner analogized NLRB panels to panels 
of circuit court judges.  Invoking legislative history, New Process Steel 
argued “that the Taft-Hartley revisions were designed to make the NLRB 
function more like a court of appeals and to bring a greater variety of opin-
ions into the review of administrative decisions.”95  Similarly, in Photo-
                                                                                                                           
 94 Norton v. Shelby Cnty., 118 U.S. 425, 446 (1886).   
 95 New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 840, 847 (7th Cir. 2009), rev’d, No. 08-1457, slip 
op. (U.S. June 17, 2010). 
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Sonics, Inc. v. NLRB, the Ninth Circuit drew an analogy to cases where 
courts having three members “have issued decisions by a quorum of two 
judges when the third died or was ill.”96  In these cases, “[c]ourts have in-
terpreted ‘quorum’ to mean the ‘number of the members of the court as may 
legally transact judicial business.’”97 
In Nguyen v. United States,98 however, the Supreme Court ruled that a 
circuit court of appeals could not operate with a panel of two Article III 
judges and a third Article IV judge.  Only a panel consisting of three Article 
III judges was a properly constituted panel. 
The relevance of the judicial analogy is problematic given that the ju-
dicial statute lacks a delegation or quorum clause.  The statute starkly re-
quires that panels consist of three judges.  Moreover, Congress amended the 
statute out of concern over circuit courts too often assigning cases to panels 
of two.99 
2. Analogy to Other Administrative Agencies 
a. National Mediation Board (NMB) 
In Railroad Yardmasters of America v. Harris, the D.C. Circuit upheld 
the National Mediation Board’s delegation of its authority to a single mem-
ber, concluding that “it would seem that if the [National Mediation] Board 
can use its authority to delegate in order to operate more efficiently, then a 
fortiori the Board can use its authority in order to continue to operate when 
it otherwise would be disabled.”100  Seeking to distinguish the two federal 
agencies, the D.C. Circuit stressed that, “[u]nlike the National Labor Rela-
tions Board, the [NMB] is not principally engaged in substantive adjudica-
tions” and “does not adjudicate unfair labor practices or seek to enforce 
individual rights under [its governing statute].”101 
b. Interstate Commerce Commission 
In Nicolson v. ICC,102 a case was assigned to a panel of three commis-
sioners.  Since the case was assigned to a properly constituted group of 
three commissioners – as expressly allowed under the Interstate Commis-
sion Act – the D.C. Circuit rejected the challenge to the Commission’s   
authority to act. 
                                                                                                                           
 96 Photo-Sonics, Inc. v. NLRB, 678 F.2d 121, 122 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 97 Id. (quoting Tobin v. Ramey, 206 F.2d 505, 507 (5th Cir. 1953)). 
 98 Nguyen v. United States, 539 U.S. 69 (2003). 
 99 See New Process Steel, L.P., 564 F.3d at 848. 
 100 R.R. Yardmasters of America v. Harris, 721 F.2d 1332, 1340 n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 101 Id. at 1345. 
 102 Nicholson v. ICC, 711 F.2d 364 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
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G. Policy Arguments 
A public policy argument against allowing two-member boards to     
issue binding rulings is that such boards cannot reverse precedent.  Accord-
ing to NLRB tradition, only three-member Board majorities can overturn 
precedent.  In light of this tradition, since 2008, “Schaumber or Liebman set 
aside their policy position for ‘institutional reasons.’  This has resulted in 
parties being denied an effective remedy or defense because of the Board’s 
desire to avoid a tie-vote stalemate.”103 
Moreover, a three-person group makes good sense: “decision-making 
by odd-numbered bodies is commonplace; even-numbered or even two-
member adjudicatory bodies are not.104  The vigor of dissent cannot inform 
decisions of a two-member Board.”105  Indeed, “majority rule facilitates the 
expression of minority views.”106  Former NLRB Chairman Robert J. Bat-
tista told Congress in 2007, “[D]issent is healthy for many reasons, includ-
ing the assurance dissent provides that the members of the majority have 
considered carefully opposing views and arguments.”107 
The distinction between agencies, like the NLRB, that make policy 
through adjudications, not rulemaking, has also been enlisted in support of 
the view that two-member boards are to be discouraged. 
New Process Steel’s brief emphasized that the NLRB makes policy 
through adjudication, not rulemaking, as a policy argument in favor of a 
three-member quorum.108  According to this argument, “a two-member body 
does not maximize the potential for meaningful debate or consideration of 
differing viewpoints.  It is simply too small to be representative or even to 
permit a decision by a majority vote.”109 
V.    DEALING WITH THE BOARD’S PRE-NEW PROCESS STEEL DECISIONS 
Since the Supreme Court ruled in New Process Steel that three mem-
bers constitute a quorum necessary for Board action, the question arises: 
What to do with the hundreds of decisions rendered by a rump board?  Part 
V assesses this question from three perspectives: 1) what impact the      
                                                                                                                           
 103 Brief for the Michigan Regional Council of Carpenters as Amicus Curiae in Support of Peti-
tioner at 17, New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, No. 08-1457, slip op. (U.S. June 17, 2010). 
 104 While both the Federal Election Commission and the International Trade Commission have an 
even number of Commissioners (6), their enabling statutes spell out either the need for a supermajority 
(4 votes), 2 U.S.C. §§ 437(c), 437d(a)(6)-(9), or other ways of handling tie votes, 19 U.S.C. § 1330(a), 
(d).  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 56, at 25 n.11.   
 105 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 56, at 15. 
 106 Id. at 26. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 56, at 34. 
 109 Id. (citing Robert’s Rules of Order, § 3 (10th ed. 2001)). 
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Supreme Court ruling itself can have on this question; 2) what Congress can 
do to amend the NLRA to deal with past decisions and the possibility of 
two-member boards again in the future; and 3) what the NLRB itself can do 
– either through ratification or reconsideration – to dispose of nearly 600 
cases decided by a two-member Board. 
Both the Supreme Court majority and dissent in New Process Steel 
noted that the Board had also delegated authority to the general counsel, 
who made use of that authority over the 27-month two-member board   
period.  On July 7, 2010, the newly constituted five-member board ratified 
the December 2007 temporary delegation, stating “[a]lthough we believe 
that the court litigation delegation has always been valid, this ratification is 
intended to remove any question that has arisen or may arise regarding that 
delegation.  Accordingly, the board hereby ratifies the court litigation au-
thority of the general counsel described in the December 28, 2007 delega-
tion.”110  On that same day, the board also “ratified all personnel, adminis-
trative, and procurement actions taken by the two members during the 27-
month period, including but not limited to appointments of regional direc-
tors, administrative law judges, and senior executives.”111 
A. Impact of Supreme Court’s Ruling 
There are three approaches the Supreme Court can take in deciding the 
issue of retroactivity, according to Justice Souter in James B. Beam Distil-
ling Co. v. Georgia: 
1) Most commonly, “a decision may be made fully retroactive, apply-
ing both to the parties before the court and to all others by and against 
whom claims may be pressed, consistent with res judicata and proce-
dural barriers such as statutes of limitations.”112 
2) A court may apply its new rule wholly prospectively, “neither to the 
parties in the law making decision nor to those others against or by 
whom it might be applied to conduct or events occurring before that 
decision.”113 
3) A court may turn to “selective prospectivity,” where it applies the 
new rule to the parties in the case in which it is announced, but refuses 
                                                                                                                           
 110 Edwin S. Hopson, “NLRB Further Responds to Supreme Court’s New Process Steel Decision,” 
Wyatt Employment Law Report, July 9, 2010 (on file with author). 
 111 Id. 
 112 501 U.S. 529, 535 (1991). 
 113 Id. at 536. 
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to apply it retroactively to other cases based on facts antedating its 
new rule.114 
Since the Supreme Court had never before ruled on what constitutes a 
proper quorum for the NLRB, no party could make the case that it         
reasonably relied on either a two-member or three-member quorum re-
quirement.  As the Supreme Court said in Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 
“a judicial construction of a statute is an authoritative statement of what the 
statute meant before as well as after the decision of the case giving rise to 
that construction.”115 
In assessing which of these approaches to take, the Court weighs the 
following policies: finality, fairness, reliance and stare decisis.116  These 
policies, in turn, are shaped by whether the Supreme Court is 1) creating a 
new rule, 2) overturning its own precedent, or 3) interpreting a statutory 
provision for the first time (i.e., where there is no precedent at all).  Since 
the Court’s decision in New Process Steel marks the first time it is address-
ing this issue, arguably the reliance and stare decisis factors drop out of the 
picture and the question of retroactivity should turn on the fairness and  
finality factors. 
Given that the Court was silent on the question of retroactivity, viewed 
prospectively the rump decisions fall into two categories: 1) all currently 
pending NLRB cases plus all pending appeals from NLRB rulings, and 2) 
all previously decided and unappealed NLRB rulings and rulings appealed, 
decided and not the subject of a pending cert petition.  A Supreme Court 
decision requiring a three-member quorum, therefore, would apply to the 
first class of cases but not to the second. 
B. Congress Can Amend the NLRA 
In 1978, the Interstate Commerce Commission faced resignations that 
left the Commission with less than seven members, the minimum number to 
conduct business.  The Commission petitioned Congress to amend the   
statute.  Congress did, allowing the Commission to act through a majority 
of the Commissioners.117 
                                                                                                                           
 114 Id. at 537. 
 115 Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 312 (1994). 
 116 See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993). 
 117 See Assure Competitive Transp., Inc. v. United States, 629 F.2d 467 (7th Cir. 1980). 
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1. Section 3(b) Amendments 
a. Amend “Quorum” Provision 
Regardless of the Supreme Court’s decision in New Process Steel, 
Congress is free to accept the Court’s interpretation of what constitutes a 
quorum or it could decide for itself whether it meant two or three members 
were required for the labor board to conduct business.  Even if the Court 
had ruled that two constitutes a Board quorum, Congress could still amend 
Section 3(b) and make clear that there must always be three NLRB mem-
bers before it may conduct business.  So long as the Supreme Court is 
merely interpreting federal law, Congress is free to overrule a Court’s    
decision simply by amending federal law.  It is only when the Court’s ruling 
involves the Constitution that Congress is not able to overrule the Court’s 
decision. 
b. Amend “Vacancy” Provision 
One option would be to amend section 3(b)’s vacancy provision, mak-
ing clear that any Board member whose term expires shall continue to serve 
until a replacement is either confirmed by the Senate or appointed by the 
President under his recess appointment power.  Petitioner’s brief cites three 
federal administrative agencies – the Federal Election Commission, the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission – whose enabling statutes prescribe that when a 
commissioner’s term expires, he or she may continue to serve until his or 
her successor has taken office as a member of the commission.118 
Aside from amending the NLRA to address future Board quorum      
issues, could Congress enact a law retroactively ratifying all decisions ren-
dered by the two-member Board?  Conceivably it could, but such a move 
creates its own separation of powers and due process questions. 
C. What the NLRB Can Do 
1. Shut Down Whenever Board Lacks a Quorum 
Any business transacted where a quorum is not present is null and void 
except for one item, and that is a motion to adjourn.  As extreme an action 
as suspending operations while a commission lacks a quorum may seem, 
Petitioner’s brief cited four federal administrative agencies that did just that 
until the lack of a quorum was remedied.119 
                                                                                                                           
 118 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 56, at 37.   
 119 Id. at 29-30. 
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2. Newly Constituted Board Can Ratify Past Decisions 
One option for dealing with decisions rendered by a Board lacking a 
quorum would be for the newly-constituted Board to simply ratify those 
decisions rather than to rehear them.  In dicta in Laurel Baye, the D.C. Cir-
cuit suggested “[p]erhaps a properly constituted Board, or the Congress 
itself, may also minimize the dislocations engendered by our decision by 
ratifying or otherwise reinstating the rump panel’s previous decisions, in-
cluding the case before us.”120  While ratification may be challenged on due 
process grounds, as a general rule, “courts cannot probe the mental process-
es of government decisionmakers.”121  Moreover, at least two of those ratifi-
ers, Liebman and Schaumber, would already be quite familiar with the cas-
es they are ratifying.  Requiring the new Board to reconsider each rump 
decision de novo would be an empty gesture and would not necessarily af-
ford parties any additional substantive or procedural rights.  Indeed, going 
back to square one might allow “parties to avoid liability entirely because 
of a statute of limitations that could be construed to bar a refiled case.”122 
Then there is the matter of cases decided by the two-member Board 
for which no quorum objection was raised.  Whether these decisions even 
need to be ratified is an open question – it may turn on whether lack of a 
quorum is a procedural or jurisdictional defect.  Under the de facto officer 
doctrine, procedural defects may be waived, but jurisdictional ones cannot. 
3. Newly Constituted Board Can Reconsider All Past Decisions 
Now that two new members have joined the labor board, thanks to re-
cess appointments, the Board might have to reconsider all the decisions 
rendered earlier by the two-member Board.  It might do so if only in the 
face of potential due process challenges raised if the new Board merely 
ratified in one fell swoop all decisions handed down by the rump panel.  
This alternative, however, poses its own risks, assuming, as it does, that the 
Board would be back to square one with these cases.  In this event, the  
statute of limitations might bar reevaluation of many if not most of these 
cases.  As such, reconsideration is a most unattractive option and should be 
undertaken only as a last resort. 
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4. NLRB Cannot Do What the SEC Did 
Unlike the NLRA, the Securities and Exchange Act did not contain a 
quorum provision.  In the face of Congressional silence on the issue, the 
SEC adopted its own rule to allow two members of the five-member SEC to 
conduct business.  In Falcon Trading Group, Ltd.,123 the D.C. Circuit upheld 
the SEC’s power to decide its own quorum in the face of congressional  
silence.  But this option is not available to the NLRB because its enabling 
statute  specifically  spells  out  the  definition  of  a  quorum,  albeit  am-
biguously.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
For now, with the addition of two recess appointments, the NLRB 
quorum issue recedes.  But the issue can re-emerge in the future as it has in 
the past.  The Supreme Court upheld the D.C. Circuit in Laurel Baye and 
concluded the NLRB must consist of three members at all times to conduct 
business.  In light of this ruling, this article has attempted to address the 
possible options for disposing of the hundreds of cases decided by a Board 
lacking a quorum. 
As politics become more polarized, it is foreseeable that any Presi-
dent’s Board nominees flunk a cloture vote in the Senate, once again     
leaving the Board without a quorum.  Even the President’s recess appoint-
ment power might be thwarted, as it was in 2007-08, when Senate Demo-
crats prevented President Bush from making any recess appointments by 
keeping the Senate in session virtually nonstop for the last fifteen months of 
his term in office. 
The Supreme Court may have settled the quorum issue in New Process 
Steel, but the political branches of government ultimately enjoy the power 
to deny the NLRB whatever number of members are needed to conduct 
business.  The best approach for avoiding shutting down the labor board for 
lack of a quorum would be for Congress to amend section 3(b)’s vacancy 
clause to make clear that members whose terms expire will continue to 
serve until a replacement’s term begins. 
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